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Close to five million intimate partner rapes and physical assaults are
perpetrated against women in the United States annually.' Domestic
violence accounts for twenty percent of all non-fatal crime experienced
by women in this county.2 Despite these statistics, many have argued
that in the past six years the Supreme Court has "put a target on [the]
back"' of the domestic violence victim, has "significantly eroded
J.D. Candidate, Harvard Law School, Class of 2011. The author wishes to thank
Professor Alex Whiting for his comments, suggestions, and contributions to this Arti-
cle. Thanks also to the editors of the Michigan Journal of Gender &r Law for their
excellent editorial assistance.
1. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY THOENNES, NAT'L INST. OF JUSTICE & CTRS. FOR Dis-
EASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND
CONSEQUENCES OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY iii (2000), available at http://www.ncjrs.gov/
pdffilesl/nij/181867.pdf.
2. Tom Lininger, The Sound ofSilence: Holding Batterers Accountable for Silencing Their
Victims, 87 TEx. L. REv. 857, 867 (2009) [hereinafter Lininger (2009)].
3. Id at 871.
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offender accountability in domestic violence rscto ,"an hs
directly instigated a substantial decline in domestic violence
prosecutions! The asserted cause is the Court's complete and
groundbreaking re-conceptualization of the Sixth Amendment right of a
criminal defendant to confront his accusers, beginning with the historic
decision Crawford v. Washington in 2004, through Davis v. Washington
two years later, and then Giles v. California two years after that. This
Article will evaluate the Sixth Amendment right of confrontation in the
context of domestic violence cases, both to assess certain consequences
of this major constitutional shift and to suggest a change to
confrontation doctrine in order to address some of the negative
consequences that have apparently resulted. This Article engages in this
consideration by way of an assessment of all state domestic violence
cases that have examined the Confrontation Clause after Davis v.
Washington.
After this brief introduction, Part I traces the recent development
of the confrontation right, from its grounding in a reliability concern in
Ohio v. Roberts, to the Crawford v. Washington "testimonial" revolution,
to the Davis v. Washington clarification (or lack thereof), and through
the Giles v. California forfeiture decision. Part 11 then explores the right
of confrontation specifically in the domestic violence context, outlining
how the change in domestic violence prosecutions and the characteris-
tics of the classic domestic violence crime have left such prosecutions
particularly vulnerable to the confrontation revolution. Part III presents
the data collected and analyzed in this study, highlighting certain results
and patterns and offering potential explanations for the findings. The
findings demonstrate that state court judges take a relatively expansive
but unpredictable approach to the Davis framework, allowing many
testimonial statements while excluding others, with little consistency.
Part IV then considers the normative question of whether there should
be a doctrinal exception to the confrontation right, as it is currently
understood. It is argued in this final part that a domestic violence ex-
ception should be created in the confrontation doctrine, for it would
help prosecute batterers and resolve existing classification inconsisten-
cy, while still sufficiently protecting defendant rights. The domestic
violence exception would function as a part of-rather than separately
from-the currently existing Crawford/Davis confrontation framework
4. Melissa Moody, A Blow to Domestic Violence Victims: Applying the "Testimonial State-
ments'" Test in Crawford v. Washington, I11 Wmi. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 387, 388
(2005).
5. Tom Lininger, Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford, 91 VA. L. Ray. 747, 749-50
(2005) [hereinafter Lininger (2005)].
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by reclassifying all victim statements within an abusive relationship as
non-testimonial, and as such admissible, if satisfying other evidentiary
requirements.
It should be acknowledged at the outset that there are limitations to
the data presented in this Article. As will be detailed below, this author
examined a small sample of cases and only reviewed the record as pre-
sented in the decision, excluding trial transcripts. The coding categories
used were somewhat broad and at times it was difficult to determine the
factors upon which a judicial decision rested. Accordingly, the conclu-
sions reached in this Article are limited. Limitations recognized,
however, the data presented and the topics explored in this Article re-
main valuable. The cases and opinions that are analyzed present a
significant and helpful snapshot of judicial decision-making post-Davis,
and the themes and arguments offered encourage forward-thinking dis-
cussion and debate on how the confrontation right and domestic
violence interact.
I. RECENT DEVELOPMENTS IN THE RIGHT OF CONFRONTATION
The Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution guarantees that, " [] n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right . .. to be confronted with the witnesses against
him."' From the language of the amendment, it is clear that this right
applies only in criminal prosecutions, concerns only witnesses against
the defendant, and is satisfied by confrontation . The exact scope of this
right, however, has drastically expanded within the last several years
based on how the Supreme Court has defined "witnesses" and their
statements. The Court has always understood witness statements to in-
clude in-court testimony as well as some, but not all, out-of-court
hearsay statements! However, its 2004 decision in Crawford v. Washing-
ton reinvigorated the confrontation right by completely redefining the
meaning of the out-of-court hearsay statements with which the right is
concerned!
6. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
7. The consensus within the United States judiciary is that the right "to be confronted"
is "the tight to be in the courtroom with a witness, to look at him face-to-face, and to
cross-examine him." Clifford S. Fishman, Confrontation. Forfeiture, and Giles v. Cali-
fornia: An Interim User's Guide, 5 8 CATH. U. L. Ritv. 703, 707 (2009).
8. Hearsay statements are those out-of-court statements introduced to prove the truth of
the matter asserted. FED. R. EVID. 801 1(c).
9. See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 68-69 (2004).
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Prior to Crawford, the 1980 Ohio v. Roberts decision defined the
meaning of the right of confrontation."0 In Roberts, the Court was ulti-
mately concerned with reliability, as it saw the underlying purpose of the
Confrontation Clause as a safeguard against the use of untrustworthy
evidence against a criminal defendant. Accordingly, in the test created
under Roberts, a prosecutor could introduce hearsay statements without
also calling the declarant as a witness as long as the prosecutor could
demonstrate Wi the unavailability of the declarant and (ii) that the
statement had sufficient "indicia of reliability."" The Court found that a
statement could be deemed sufficiently reliable in one of two ways.
First, the statement would be admissible if the prosecution could
demonstrate that it fell within a "firmly rooted" hearsay exception, such
as the dying declaration exception, the business records exception, or the
public records exception.'" Second, even if the prosecution could not
show that the statement fell within such an exception, the statement
would still be admissible if the prosecution could demonstrate statement
reliability by meeting the standard of "Particularized guarantee of trust-
worthiness."'" Under this criterion, the prosecution was able to admit
much unconfronted hearsay (i.e. out-of-court statements made by a de-
clarant who did not face cross-examination, introduced to prove the
truth of the matter asserted) as sufficiently reliable.
In the years following the Roberts decision, the Court made it yet
easier for the prosecution to introduce unconfronted hearsay against a
defendant by weakening and virtually destroying any significant re-
quirements to either the unavailability or the reliability portions of the
admissibility test."' Consequently, post-Roberts, the Confrontation
Clause did little work: much unconfronted hearsay was routinely admit-
ted against the accused, and the consensus was that the "'Roberts test'
was not much of a test at all."'1
5
10. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56, 76-77 (1980).
11. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 65-66.
12. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
13. Roberts, 448 U.S. at 66.
14. See White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 354-56 (1992) (finding the unavailability test of
little benefit and thus unnecessary in situations involving hearsay admitted under the
spontaneous declarations exception or under the medical treatment exception); Bout-
jaily v. United States, 483 U.S. 171, 183 (1987) (finding that it was unnecessary to
make an independent assessment of reliability of a co-conspirator statement, as the
exception was sufficiently "firmly tooted"); United States v. Inadi, 475 U.S. 387,
398-99 (1986) (limiting the Roberts unavailability test to situations involving the use
of the prior testimony exception); Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 756-60.
15. Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 760.
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In 2004, however, the Supreme Court revitalized the confrontation
right by wholly re-conceptualizing the right's purpose, and thereby al-
tered the type of statements with which it was concerned. In Crawford,
the prosecution sought to admit tape-recorded statements of a non-
testifying declarant's interview with the police. The defendant argued
the admission of the tapes violated his Sixth Amendment right of con-
frontation. Rejecting the Roberts test, the Supreme Court agreed. The
opinion, authored by Justice Scalia, surveyed the history of the Con-
frontation Clause, beginning with Roman law, through English
common law, the American colonies, and the states. From this historical
inquiry, the majority drew two inferences. The first inference was that
"1the principal evil at which the Confrontation Clause was directed was
the civil-law mode of criminal procedure, and particularly its use of ex
parte examinations as evidence against the accused."'" Using this infer-
ence, the Court rejected the notion that the confrontation right is only
concerned with in-court statements and also rejected the complete over-
lap between hearsay statements and those statements implicating
confrontation.17 In doing so, the Court made the crucial distinction of
the confrontation right as one between "testimonial" and "non-
testimonial" statements. The second inference drawn by the majority
from the history was that "the Framers would not have allowed admis-
sion of testimonial statements of a witness who did not appear at trial
unless he was unavailable to testify, and the defendant had had a prior
opportunity for cross-examination."' Thus, replacing the overruled
Roberts test, the Court established the new Crawford rule: testimonial
statements may only be admitted against a criminal defendant when the
declarant is unavailable and the defendant had a previous opportunity
for cross-examination.
In drawing these inferences and creating the new rule, the Court
rejected Roberts' conception of the right as solely concerned with relia-
bility. Instead, under Crawford, while the right of confrontation does
have an "ultimate goal" of ensuring reliability, it is fundamentally a pro-
cedural and not substantive right, such that "it commands, not that
evidence be reliable, but that reliability be assessed in a particular man-
ner: by testing in the crucible of cross-examination. "'9 Crawford
therefore severed the connection between hearsay analysis and confron-
tation analysis, such that each is now a distinct consideration, and
16. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 50 (2004).
17. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 50-51.
18. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 53-54.
19. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 61.
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hinged the confrontation analysis on whether a statement can be charac-
terized as testimonial.
While "testimonial" versus "non-testimonial" became the new
critical consideration of Confrontation Clause analysis, the Majority in
Crawford did little to define the terms, leaving "for another day any
effort to spell out a comprehensive definition of 'testimonial.' "'20 The
Court did recognize a "core class" of testimonial statements, however,
including ex parte testimony at a preliminary hearing, before a grand
jury or at a prior trial, and statements taken by police officers in the
course of interrogations .2 ' The declarant's tape-recorded out-of-court
statements to the police in Crawford were deemed clearly testimonial as
part of a police interrogation and thus inadmissible . 2
Two years later, the Supreme Court returned to the confrontarion
issue in Davis v. Washington .2 ' Davis consolidated two cases: Davis v.
Washington and Indiana v. Hammon, both of which involved domestic
violence and both of which considered whether certain statements made
to law enforcement personnel are "testimonial" and therefore potentially
inadmissible under Crawford. 14 In Davis, the relevant statements were
those made to a 911 emergency operator by the victim who stated that
her ex-boyfriend was "here jumpin' on me again," was "usin' his fists,"
and then slightly later in the conversation, was "r[unning] out the
door.",2 ' The 911 operator went on to ask the victim a series of ques-
tions, and the police showed up within four minutes to find the victim
looking "shaken" and "'frantic.' 2 In Hammn h relevant statements
were those made by the victim to police officers who had responded to a
domestic disturbance complaint. When the police arrived, the victim
opened the door looking "somewhat frightened" but stated that "noth-
ing was the matter."2 1 She allowed the police to enter, however, and
upon talking with the police, separately from her husband, admitted
that her husband had assaulted her and signed an affidavit to that ef-
fect.2
8
20. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
21. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
22. Crawford, 541 U.S. at 68.
23. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819 (2006).
24. In addition to addressing whether statements made to law enforcement are testimoni-
al, the Court also found the Confrontation Clause inapplicable to non-testimonial
statements. This had been "suggested in Crawford, even if not explicitly held" but was
absolutely confirmed in Davis. Davis, 547 U.S. at 823-24.
25. Davis, 547 U.S. at 817-18.
26. Davis, 547 U.S. at 818.
27. Davis, 547 U.S. at 819.
28. Davis, 547 U.S. at 8 19-20.
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W~(hile the Court, again in an opinion authored by Justice Scalia,
declined to "produce an exhaustive classification"' of testimonial and
non-testimonial statements, it did provide more guidance on the issue,
asserting that "[s] tatements are non-testimonial when made in the
course of police interrogation under circumstances objectively indicating
that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to enable police assis-
tance to meet an ongoing emergency. They are testimonial when the
circumstances objectively indicate that there is no such ongoing emer-
gency, and that the primary purpose of the interrogation is to establish
or prove past events potentially relevant to later criminal prosecution."
The Court thus created the "primary purpose" and "ongoing emergen-
cy"1 test to classify statements to law enforcement. Under this rubric, the
Majority found the statements made in Davis to the 911 operator to be
non-testimonial while the statements made in Hammon to the police
officers to be testimonial. The Court considered the following factors in
making this distinction between Davis and Hammon (and also between
Davis and Crawford, for the majority refers back to the facts in their pre-
vious confrontation decision): (i) whether the victim-declarant was
speaking about events "as they were actually happening"0 ; (ii) whether
the victim-declarant was "facing an ongoing emergency",31; (iii) whether
the statements of the victim-declarant "were necessary to be able to re-
solve the present emergency, rather than simply to learn . .. what had
happened in the past"3 "; and (iv) the level of formality of the inter-
views."3 On each one of these factors, the Court distinguished Davis
from Hammon and Crawford. The Court observed that in Davis, the
victim was speaking about the abuse as it actually happened, faced an
ongoing emergency, needed help to resolve an ongoing emergency, and
was communicating in a frantic rather than tranquil or formal manner.
In Hammon, and previously in Crawford, the Court found that the vic-
tims were speaking about the abuse after it had happened, were not
experiencing an ongoing emergency when speaking to police, were mak-
ing statements to explain what had happened, and were doing so in a
calm, formal, and organized manner. Accordingly, despite the fact that
both victim-declarants were unavailable at trial and had not been previ-
ously crossed by the defendant, only the non-testimonial statements in
29. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822.
30. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
31. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
32. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
33. Davis, 547 U.S. at 827.
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Davis were admissible, while the testimonial statements in Hammon
were not admissible.4
In Giles v, California in 2008, the Court again decided a major
confrontation case also involving a domestic violence victim's statements
to law enforcement . 3 ' The issue was whether a defendant, in murdering
his victim, forfeited his right of confrontation by making the victim-
declarant unavailable .3 6 The majority again based its opinion on histori-
cal considerations and found that the forfeiture doctrine only applies
when the prosecution is able to establish that "the defendant engaged in
conduct designed to prevent the witness from testifying."R Accordingly,
under Giles, it is not sufficient to find that the defendant took actions
against the victim-declarant resulting in unavailability. Instead, the pros-
ecution must be able to demonstrate a specific intent by the defendant
to block the victim-declarant's testimony at trial .3 s The specific intent
requirement is a more stringent requirement than many lower courts
had been using pre-Giles.3
34. The Supreme Court remanded the H-ammon decision to consider the issue of forfei-
ture, such that if the lower court did find that the defendant had forfeited his right of
confrontation, then the testimonial statements would still be admissible, even if the
victim-dleclarant was unavailable and had not been subject to cross-examination. Da-
vis, 547 U.S. at 834.
35. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678 (2008).
36. In both Crawford and Davis, the Supreme Court briefly mentioned the issue of forfei-
ture of the confrontation right. In both opinions, the Court reaffirmed the existence
of a forfeiture exception without providing much detail. In Crawford, the Court said,
"the rule of forfeiture by wrongdoing (which we accept) extinguishes confrontation
claims on essentially equitable grounds." Crawford, 541 U.S. at 62. In Davis, the
Court said, "[wle reiterate what we said in Crawford ... [wie take no position on the
standards necessary to demonstrate such forfeiture ... Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
37. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2680.
38. There has been much commentary on the Giles decision specifically in relation to
domestic violence cases. Most commentary is critical of Giles, finding the burden of
specific intent too high for the government to prove. However, there are commenta-
tots who view Giles as less devastating to domestic violence prosecutions than others,
emphasizing the tools remaining for prosecutors, the ambiguity in the opinion, and
potential changes that can be made within the framework to improve the chances for
the prosecution. See, e.g., Fishman, supra note 7; Aiysha Hussain, Reviving Hope for
Domestic Violence Prosecutions: Giles v. California, 46 Am. CRim. L. Ruv. 1301
(2009); Lininger (2009), supra note 2; Deborah Tuerkheimer, Forfeiture After Giles:
The Relevance of "Domestic Violence Context, " 13 Lawis & CIARKL. Ray. 711 (2009).
39. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, No. C042274, 2006 WL 3648929 (Cal. Ct. App. Dec.
14, 2006) (explaining that defendant forfeited his ability to raise a Crawford challenge
because he murdered the victim, thereby rendering her unavailable to testify); State v.
Moua Her, 750 N.W. 2d 258 (Minn. 2008) (holding, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Giles, that the applicability of the forfeiture by wrongdoing doctrine does
not require specific intent); State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444 (Mont. 2008) (holding,
prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Giles, that the applicability of the forfeiture
Vol. 17:175182
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I1. THE DOMESTIC VIOLENCE CONTEXT
Although the Confrontation Clause revolution has influenced all
types of criminal prosecutions, it is clear that prosecutions of domestic
violence have been particularly affected.' Domestic violence prosecu-
tions often rely very heavily on hearsay statements of victims, many of
which become inadmissible testimonial evidence under Crawford. It is
both the history and development of domestic violence prosecutions as
well as the specific nature of crimes of domestic violence that make the
Crawfo rd/Davis line of confrontation cases especially detrimental to such
prosecutions.
Today the concept of domestic violence as a public health crisis fig-
ures prominently in societal consciousness and, accordingly, represents a
crime that prosecutors take seriously. However, this has not always been
so. Until the last several decades, domestic violence was viewed largely as
a private family matter and not a concern for the criminal justice system
or society as a whole."' Although many American states adopted anti-
domestic violence laws in the nineteenth century, they were only
enforced in the most violent of circumstances involving serious injury to
the victim." It was not until the 1 970s and 1 980s that domestic vio-
lence advocates were able to successfully raise awareness of domestic
violence as a larger societal problem. Advocates for the first time
received attention from policymnakers, and the government began sup-
porting shelters for victims, batterer intervention programs, and
empirical studies on domestic violence."3 With this public transfor-
mation in acknowledging the occurrence of domestic violence came a
transformation in charging and prosecuting domestic violence. The
prosecutorial transformation, however, lagged behind the innovations in
the public sphere, with prosecutorial changes not implemented until the
by wrongdoing doctrine does not require specific intent); People v. Costello, 53 Cal.
Rptr. 3d 288 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (explaining rationale for not requiring specific in-
tent).
40. Prosecutions for child abuse and elder abuse have also been specifically affected by the
Crawford revolution due to many of the same reasons as in the domestic violence
context, however, this Article will not address these child and elder abase prosecu-
tions. For a sampling of commentators' discussions on the specific negative impact of
Crawford/Davis on domestic violence cases, see infra note 57.
41. Davis Jaros, The Lessons of People v. Moscat: Confronting judicial Bias in Domestic
Violence Cases Interpreting Crawford v. Washington, 42 Am. Cium. L. Ruv. 995,
1000 (2005).
42. Id. at 1000-01.
43. Id. at1001.
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late 1 980s and 1 990S.4' The lack of attention and response to the prob-
lem of domestic violence in state prosecutors' offices drew much
criticism from domestic violence advocates. In response to this criticism,
specialized courts were developed for handling domestic violence cases,
judges received sensitivity training in issues surrounding domestic vio-
lence, 45and states passed new criminal procedures for domestic violence
cases.4 Prosecutor offices also implemented "no drop" policies and "evi-
dence-based prosecutions" for domestic violence cases, demonstrating
their commitment to these types of cases.4
Evidence-based prosecutions, also called "victimless prosecutions,"
are prosecutions that do not require the victim's live testimony, enabling
the government instead to present certain types of hearsay evidence to
prove its case .1 7 In domestic violence cases, the out-of-court statements
often are those made by the victim to a 911 operator or the responding
police officers. The specifics of "no drop" policies vary from jurisdiction
to jurisdiction but generally necessitate a prosecutor to pursue the do-
mestic violence case even over the victim's objections." These two
strategies enable prosecutors to bring domestic violence cases despite the
absence of a victim and, accordingly, because of the specific nature of
the crime of domestic violence (discussed below), have served to dramat-
ically increase the number of domestic violence prosecutions.
Two key aspecrs of the crime of domestic violence create eviden-
tiary obstacles in the prosecution of batterers. Tom Lininger, in
"Prosecuting Batterers After Crawford," provides an insightful commen-
tary on this relationship between battered women and prosecutors. First,
victims of domestic violence are more likely than any other crime victim
to recant or refuse to cooperate with police after initially providing in-
formation to them.4" Approximately eighty percent of victims do not
44. Id.
45. For example, states increasingly allowed warrantless arrests in domestic violence cases,
provided discretionary arrest authority to police, imposed laws effectively requiring
overnight lock-up of the suspected abuser, and imposed new record-keeping require-
ments in domestic abuse cases. Richard D. Friedman & Bridget McCormack, Dial-In
Testimony, 150 U. PA. L. Ruv. 1171, 1184-88 (2002).
46. Jaros, supra note 4 1, at 100 1-02.
47. Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 751-52.
48. Friedman & McCormack, supra note 45, at 1188. No drop policies are very contro-
versial; debates concern both the effectiveness of such policies and the potential of
such polices to deprive the victim of choice and agency in an arguably paternalistic
manner. Id. at 1189. See also Angela Corsilles, Note, No-Drop Policies in the Prosecu-
tion of Domestic Violence Cases: Guarantee to Action or Dangerous Solution? 63
FoRDHAm L. Risv. 853 (1994).
49. Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 768.
Vol. 17:175184
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assist in the prosecution of their domestic violence cases.5 0 Numerous
reasons are given for this refusal to cooperate, the primary reason being
fear of retaliation by the batterers.5 ' Additional explanations include
economic dependence of the victims; emotional attachment to batterers;
desire to keep families together; religious and cultural views of relation-
ships; fear of state intervention and taking away of children; concern of
deportation (of batterer and/or victim); "learned helplessness" created by
recurring abuse; and a belief by the victim that no crime has in fact oc-
curred.5" Second, domestic violence is a crime that commonly occurs at
home and in private." As a result, often the only witnesses to the crime
will be the victim and the defendant.
The high likelihood both that victims will refuse to cooperate and
that there will be no other witnesses often requires prosecutors to rely
primarily on hearsay evidence. This type of hearsay evidence generally
consists of 911 emergency calls, verbal statements given by the victim to
the police upon their arrival at the scene, and written statements given
by the victim, such as affidavits or civil restraining orders. Under the
formally obsolete Roberts framework, these types of out-of-court state-
ments were routinely admitted without the presence of the declarant in
court, thus enabling domestic violence prosecutions to proceed. 5 Under
the new Crawford framework, however, if these statements are deemed
testimonial (and the victim has in fact chosen not to testifyr), then their
admission would be barred as a violation of the defendant's Sixth
Amendment right. Without these types of statements, a considerable
barrier is erected for the prosecutor in "utilizing the criminal justice sys-
tem to combat domestic violence.",
5 6
111. THE DATA: Is THERE A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE "EXCEPTION"?
As described above, the generally accepted interpretation of the
post- Crawford/Davis legal state of affairs is that prosecutors in domestic
50. Id at 751 (citing People v. Brown, 94 P.3d 574, 576 (Cal. 2004)).
51. Id. at 768-79.
52. Id at 769-70.
53. Michael Baxter, The Impact of Davis v. Washington on Domestic Violence Prosecutions,
29 WOMEN's RTs. L. REP. 213, 215 (2008).
54. Id.
55. See generally Friedman & McCormack, supra note 45 (discussing the heavy prosecu-
torial use and judicial acceptance of out-of-court statements, especially 911 calls in
domestic violence cases, under the Roberts framework, and advocating for a change in
the interpretation of the Confrontation Clause).
56. Jaros, supra note 4 1, at 1002.
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violence cases will often be left with little admissible evidence and there-
fore have difficulty prosecuting batterers. This has resulted in heavy
criticism of the Supreme Court decisions. Some commentators have
argued that in order to address this problem, judges will effectively ig-
nore the new constitutional framework and admit evidence under the
old Roberts reliability framework as they see fit based on the current
prosecution."8 Commentators have also directed criticism at the
Supreme Court's lack of clarity in both the Crawford and Davis opinions
regarding what constitutes testimonial as opposed to non-testimonial
evidence. These commentators argue that the Supreme Court created
much confusion for lower courts in these decisions, leading to incon-
sistency in judicial opinions on admissibility." It is these claims and
criticisms that this Article attempts to explore through a survey of
57. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 53, at 224 ("The decision in Hammon, of course, was seen
certainly as a blow to prosecutors."); Michael H. Graham, The Davis Narrowing of
Crawford: Is the Primary Purpose Test of Davis Jurisprudentially Sound "Workable, "
and "Predictable'?, 42 C~im. L. BULL., NO. 5, at 604 (2006) (finding the Crawford
and Davis decisions ro "pave [a road that] is rocky, difficult to navigate, lacks a clear
jurisprudential foundation, and creates very bizarre and potentially hazardous re-
sults"); Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 752 (noting the "district attorneys, defense
attorneys, judges, victims' advocates and scholars [that] have predicted a significant
reduction of evidence-based prosecutions because of Crawford"); Moody, supra note
4, at 404 (stating that as a result of the "Court's intentionally obtuse holding, many
domestic violence cases will never be prosecuted."); Myrna S. Raeder, Domestic Vio-
lence, Child Abuse, and Trustworthiness Exceptions After Crawford, 20 CRIM. JUST., 24
(Summer 2005) ("Crawford's fallout is being felt throughout the criminal justice sys-
tem, but it has had a unique impact on domestic violence ... cases.") [hereina-fter
Raeder (2005)].
58. See, e.g., Baxter, supra note 53, at 225 (finding that many judges "will try to admit
what they believe is reliable evidence despite the fact that Crawford's holding obviated
the Roberts reliability standard"); Jatos, supra note 41, at 1008-09 (noting that "[iin
order to fully understand many Crawford decisions, one must appreciate the unique
dynamics of domestic violence prosecutions and the unusual role that many judges
adopt in such cases" as "those who stop the violence" and thus take a more expansive
view of non-testimonial statements.).
59. See Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 781 ("The lower courts' treatment of victim's
statements to responding officers is unpredictable-just as unpredictable, perhaps, as
the courts' analyses of reliabiliry during the Roberts era."); Moody, supra note 4, at
394 ("Nowhere has the application of the testimonial statements test been more pain-
fully inconsistent than in the area of domestic violence."); Myrna S. Raeder,
Confrontation Cla use Analysis After Davis, 22 CRIM. JUST., 10, 13-14 (Summer 2007)
(asserting that "as with justice Stewart's view of pornography, we are left with little
guidance other than we will know testimonial statements when we hear them," and
that the "answer to whether a statement is testimony may vary greatly depending on
the viewpoint from which the judge analyzes the call"); Raeder (2005), supra note 57,
at 26 (stating that in Crawford, the "Court provided no clear definition as to what is
'testimonial' ... [ulndoubtedly, the vagueness was required in order to obtain a ma-
joriry").
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domestic violence cases post-Davis. The analysis aims to determine
whether de facto judicial evidentiary exceptions are present, such that
hearsay evidence is still being admitted despite Davis mandates, and to
determine whether classification inconsistencies exist in the cases, such
that the determination of a statement to be testimonial or not is unpre-
dictable or irregular.
This author reviewed state appellate and Supreme Court domestic
violence cases involving the Confrontation Clause after Davis v. Wash-
ing-ton (decided in 2006). "Domestic violence cases" limited the sample
to cases that involved a prosecution based on violence between adults
who were currently in an intimate relationship at the time of the vio-
lence, or two adults who had formerly been in such a relationship. 60 The
sample was limited to those cases decided that examined or discussed
the Confrontation Clause issue, not just mentioning or citing Crawford
or Davis. The sample was limited to those state cases decided after Davis
because, as mentioned above, the Court in Crawford provided very little
guidance on the classification of evidence as testimonial. Accordingly,
even if claims of inconsistency were valid post-Crawford, could be ex-
plained they at least partially by the lack of judicial commentary in the
decision. If those inconsistencies persist post-Davis, it is likely to be the
result of the new confrontation framework rather than a lack of clarity.
With the above-mentioned parameters, the sample contained
eighty-two state cases: sixty-nine appellate level cases and thirteen Su-
preme Court cases .6 For each of those eighty-two cases, the
Confrontation Clause issues were recorded, including the type of hear-
say evidence that was offered, the classification of the evidence as
testimonial or non-testimonial, the key factors for the classification of
each statement, any forfeiture claims at issue and the ultimate ruling on
admissibility of the evidence. Each type of hearsay evidence was assigned
to one of the following categories: (1) 911 call; (2) verbal statements
made to police immediately upon arrival at the incident; (3) later verbal
statements made to police regarding the incident; (4) statements of the
victim made to medical personnel (including doctors, nurses and para-
medics); (5) statements of the victim made to non-police regarding the
incident (including friends, family and neighbors); and (6) miscellane-
60. The sample was obtained by keyciting Davis v. Washington and locating the terms
"domestic violence," "domestic dispute," "spousal abuse," or "intimate partner vio-
lence." It is not argued that this sample found every state case involving a domestic
abuse prosecution and Crawford-Davis issue, but it is at the very least a representative
sample.
61. See Appendix at the end of this Article for a table breaking down the numbers given
in this section.
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ous written statements of the victim (including transcripts, affidavits
and notes). Categories one, two, and three contained some statements
made by non-victims (mostly children), but the majority were victim
statements. The remaining three categories were all victim statements.
The questions of an expansion (or not) of Davis and the existence
(or not) of predictability are explored below by first analyzing the
judicial classification of statements as testimonial or not and then briefly
examining the overall rate of admissibility of the hearsay statements at
issue. The focus in the testimonial section will be on categories one,
two, and three as those were the bulk of statements at issue in the
opinions. The results demonstrate an apparent expansion of the Davis
framework, with much unconfronted hearsay admitted in two ways:
first, statements that are objectively testimonial under Davis often were
found to be non-testimonial, and second, those statements found to be
non-testimonial by a lower court but testimonial by a higher court on
appeal frequently were deemed harmless error and ultimately admissible.
The results also demonstrate a lack of predictability in the testimonial
versus non-testimonial classifications, as similarly contexted statements
were often classified differently, with no consistent explanatory factor.
Two potential explanations, individually or conjunctively, may explain
these results. First, perhaps the Court in Davis actually construed "non-
testimonial" broadly but also vaguely, enabling the admission of much
unconfronted hearsay but without much guidance. Second, perhaps
some, but not all, judges are consciously undertaking a broad reading of
Davis, admitting evidence they deem to be reliable and/or necessary to a
prosecution, judgments that may differ among judges.
A. Testimonial Versus Non- Testimonial"2
The eighty-two cases contained a total of 137 hearsay statements at
issue. Of those one hundred and thirty-seven, seventy-seven were found
to be non-testimonial, forty-six were found to be testimonial and four-
teen were not ruled upon (either because the case was decided or
remanded through harmless error, forfeiture or another unrelated issue
on appeal). Of the 137, thirty-four were coded as (1) 911 calls, sixty-one
as (2) immediate statements to police, twenty-one as (3) later statements
to police, five as (4) statements to medical personnel, eleven as
(5) statements to non-police and five as (6) written statements.
62. In the following section, "Davis v. Washington" refers to the Supreme Court decision
as a whole, while the use of only "Davis" or only "Hammon" refers to that specific set
of facts within the larger Davis v. Washington decision.
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Based on the 123 statements that were classified, it can be conclud-
ed that there is a credible domestic violence "exception", as many
statements that objectively would be classified as "testimonial" under
Davis v. Washington have in fact been judged "non-testimonial" by the
state courts. This apparent expansion of Davis v. Washington in these
domestic violence cases is limited, however, because the classification of
the statements is inconsistent.
One hundred percent of the Category One, 911 calls, were deemed
non-testimonial. The Supreme Court in Davis v, Washington implied that
most 911 calls would qualify as non-testimonial statements, for they ordi-
narily "describe current circumstances requiring police assistance," which
constitute ongoing emergencies." The Court, however, also left open the
possibility that at least portions of 911 calls could be found to be testimo-
nial, and thus the fact that all of the calls were judged non-testimonial is
somewhat significant."4 While some of the calls analyzed in the state deci-
sions exactly mirrored the situation in Davis-the victim was speaking
about events as they were happening and was providing information clear-
ly to resolve the present emergency"5 .- others were made in situations that
failed to reach the objective level of "emergency." For instance, in cases
such as State v. Pugh and State v. Camarena, the courts found the victim's
statements to the 911 operator to be non-testimonial, even though in
both instances she described the events in rhe past tense ("my husband
was beating me up really bad" and "my boyfriend hit me") and in both
instances the defendant had already left the scene. 6 The courts in People
v. Nguyen and People v. Kaough found 911 calls to be non-testimonial
despite their having been made over thirty minutes and several hours,
respectively, after the domestic violence incident had occurred .6 ' Addi-
tionally, 911 calls were classified as non-testimonial notwithstanding the
63. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 827 ("Although one might call 911 to provide a
narrative report of a crime absent any imminent danger. [the victim's] call was plainly
a call for help against bona f'ide physical threat.").
64. Davis, 547 U.S. at 828 (explaining that the Court is not "say[ing] that a conversation
which begins as an interrogation to determine the need for emergency assistance can-
not . . . 'evolve into testimonial statements.'")
65. See, e.g., State v. Sapienza, 2009 WL 62992 (N.J. Super. App. Div. 2009) (victim
called 911 operator while hiding outside of her home, barefoot and in pajamas, after
the defendant attacked her; defendant was still looking for her and accordingly victim
was whispering and terrified, pleading for help on the phone); State v. Hewson, 642
S.E.2d 459, 466-67 (N.C. Ct. App. 2007) (victim called 9 11 operator stating, I1 am
bleeding. My husband keeps shooting me. My husband keeps shooting me").
66. State v. Pugh, 225 P.3d 892 (Wash. 2009); State v. Camarena, 176 P.3d 380 (Or.
2008).
67. People v. Nguyen, 2007 WL 1207233 (Cal. Cr. App. 2007); People v. Kaough, 2006
WL 3425030 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
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fact that the victim made the call after having found safety in a neighbor
or friend's house."' In discussing these cases, this author is not arguing
that the victims in these situations were not in need of police or medical
help. Instead, as these 911 call statements were uniformly classified as
non-testimonial, despite the variances from the Davis situation and de-
spite the arguable end of the immediate emergency, these cases represent
a pattern that is at least a small expansion upon Davis v. Washington, and
one that is also consistent and predictable.
Of the fifty-two Category Two, immediate statements to police,
classified, fifty-six percent were found to be non-testimonial and forty-
four percent to be testimonial. Of the twenty Category Three, later
statements to police, classified, ten percent were found to be non-
testimonial and ninety percent to be testimonial. All of the state court
decisions in categories two and three fit the general Hammon scene: a
domestic dispute has recently occurred and the victim is speaking to
police about the incident. An argument, therefore, could be made that
under a strict reading of Davis v. Washington, all of these statements
should be testimonial: the simple presence of police means that the vic-
tim is not alone and is not vulnerable to more attacks. Accordingly, in
all these scenarios the present emergency had dissipated, arguably mak-
ing the statements testimonial as in Hammon. Under this strict reading,
state courts are engaging in a significant expansion of Davis v. Washing-
ton in these types of victim statements.
Many of these Category Two cases, however, despite their structural
similarity to the scene in Hammon, may be distinguished from Hammon
(and compared to Davis) because of: the level of threat the defendant
still posed, for example, defendant and victim both still within the
house, unsecured by the police; the injury experienced, for example,
serious, life-threatening injuries; and the level of informality, for exam-
ple, statements made spontaneously, yelling, hysterical, while running
away, thus making the situation an "ongoing emergency." Cases such as
these, then, may be said to have been properly classified as more similar
to the Davis 911 call scenario and therefore non-testimonial within the
Davis v, Washington framework .6
68. See, e.g., State v. Moorer, 2009 WL 818945 (Ohio Ct. App. 2009); People v. Wilson,
2007 WL 1941443 (Cal. Cr. App. 2007).
69. See, e.g., State v. Smith, 746 N.W.2d 604 (Wis. Cr. App. 2008) (wherein the police
arrived at the scene and heard from inside the house, '"[h]e's beating me. He's beat-
ing me. He's hurting me ... [h]elp.'"); State v. Martin, 885 N.E.2d 18 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2008) (police arrived to find the victim sitting on the side of the street, "Icrying,
spitting out blood, hysterical"' with the defendant having fled with their children);
People v. Lewis, No, Al 18107, 2007 WL 4206637 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (police
found the victim walking down the middle of the street, in the rain, 'holding her face
Vol. 17:175190
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However, even putting this set of "obvious" non-testimonial cases
aside, there are still numerous Category Two cases that arguably expand
Davis v. Washing-ton because of their similarity to Hammon despite their
classification of statements as non- testimonial. In Hammon, the Su-
preme Court found the victim's statements to be testimonial because she
calmly made them to police officers after the violence had ended, in or-
der to explain what had happened. In the following cases, the courts
attempted to distinguish the facts at issue in various ways from those in
Hammon, but in fact the differences were often minimal or superficial.
First, for example, while not bleeding or crying, the victim in Hammon
had been frightened, anxious and injured, and while the assault may
have not "just concluded," the incident was at least recent, having oc-
curred that same night.7 In Cleveland v. Colon, however, the court
emphasized the fact that "[u~nlike the circumstances in Hammon, the
incident had just concluded when the officer arrived . .. and the victim
was hurt, bleeding and crying. ,71 Similarly, in Rodriguez v. State, the
court highlighted that in contrast to Hammon, the victim "appeared
' shaken up' and 'very scared' ... [and] had been 'assaulted' by her boy-
friend" recently.
72
Second, in evaluating the situation in Hammon, the Supreme Court
stated that "there was no emergency in progress; the interrogating officer
testified that he had heard no arguments or crashing and saw no one
throw or break anything.",7 3 The majority of state cases also involved sit-
uations with a comparable lack of ongoing violence against the victim,
either because the defendant had already halted the immediate attack or
had left the premises. But again, in an attempt to distinguish Hammon
either the courts often found the statements given to be non-testimonial
by focusing on the ptevious violence (e.g., the recentness or severity of
the previous violence) or by focusing on the absence of the defendant
(e.g., the missing defendant created an emergency despite the current
lack of violence)."
Third, the Supreme Court deemed the statements made in Ham-
mon "formal enough" because the victim was separated from her
husband and the questions were for the police investigation. Various
cases, including People v. Otis and State v. Bonvillain, satisfied this level
in her hands and crying loudly" while bleeding profusely, with the defendant's loca-
tion unknown).
70. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 819-20 (2006) (referring to Hammon v. Indi-
ana, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind. 2005)).
71. Cleveland v. Colon, No. 87824, 2007 WL 179082 (Ohio Ct. App. 2007).
72. Rodriguez v. State, 274 S.W.3d 760, 763 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008).
73. Davis, 547 U.S. at 829.
74. See, e.g., infra notes 79 and 84.
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of minimal formality, but the courts still judged the statements non-
testimonial, either by underscoring other aspects of the situation (i.e. the
injury or fear of the victim) or by simply stating that the situation was
"informal" without providing further elaboration." Finally, some courts
almost explicitly rejected the Davis v. Washington framework: one court
found statements to be non-testimonial even while acknowledging that
the situation had "not ris[en] to the level of 'crisis' or 'emergency,'", 76
and another even while acknowledging that the victim was sufficiently
"1protected because an officer was present. 7 7 The courts in cases such as
these therefore widely construed "ongoing emergency" in order to dis-
tinguish their cases from Hammon and find the statements admissible.
Even more striking than the suggested expansion of Davis v. Wash-
ington for these statements, however, is the inconsistency in the
classification of the Category Two statements. The Category Two state-
ments, which comprised essentially half of all statements analyzed, had
close to a fifty-fifty chance of being in either Category. Statements
emerging from virtually identical situations were classified differently
and characteristics of the statements and scenarios were weighed and
used in disparate manners by the courts. Per Davis v. Washington, courts
uniformly framed the inquiry as one of whether there was an "1ongoing
emergency" to which police had the "primary purpose" of responding.
Courts engaged in this inquiry by looking primarily to the following
factors: whether the victim was "upset" (i.e. crying, hysterical, yelling);
whether the victim was injured and in need of medical attention; the
amount of time that had elapsed since the incident; the nature of the
"interrogation"; and the presence or absence of the defendant at the sce-
ne. None of these factors, however, was uniformly determinative of
whether the court found a situation to constitute an "ongoing emergen-
cy.
Many courts that found statements to be non-testimonial empha-
sized the hysteria, fear, anxiety and injury of the victim as an important
factor in finding an "ongoing emergency." 7 ' But in all the decisions
75. People v. Otis, No. D046547, 2007 WL 18814 at * 13(Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (the
"informal setting" was at the victim's house while victim was complaining of pain in
her thumb and head); State v. Bonvillain, 2008 WL 2064978 at * 4 (La. Ct. App.
2008) (discussing fear of victim and purpose of resolving emergency to find state-
ments non-testimonial).
76. People v. Otis, 2007 WL 18814 at * 13.
77. People v. Suniga, No. F052710, 2008 WL 3090622 at * 17 (Cal. Ct. App. 2008).
78. See, e.g., Thomas v. State, 668 S. E. 2d 711 (Ga. 2008) (focusing on the fact that the
victim was bleeding profusely in finding her statements to be non-testimonial);
Cleveland v. Colon, No. 87824, 2007 WL 179082 at * 4 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 25,
2007) (finding statements non-testimonial when "the victim was bleeding from the
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where the statement at issue was judged testimonial, the victims too
were injured, upset and fearful-and some significantly So. 9 While the
time that had elapsed between the incident and statement was an im-
portant consideration-such that the less time elapsed, the more likely
the court was to deem the statement non-testimonial-there were
several non-testimonial statements where significant time had passed
(including cases of thirty minutes and several hours) and several testi-
monial statements where very little time had passed." While the
spontaneity of a victim statement was a factor for some courts in finding
it non-testimonial,"! courts also stressed that spontaneity was not neces-
sary, noting that a more formal question/answer exchange may also
produce non-testimonial statements." Courtsfidn stem tset-
face, and she was upset and crying"); People v. Lewis, No, Al 15107, 2007 WL
4206637 at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. 1 Nov. 29, 2007) (explaining that because victim was
"1crying, 'very shaken up,' and had not received any medical treatment for her inju-
ries," the officer was addressing an ongoing emergency); State v. Shea, 965 A.2d 504,
505 (Vt. 2008) (reporting that when the officer arrived, victim was "frantic, crying,
bleeding from the nose and cut over her eye").
79. See, e.g., State v. Ramirez, No. COAO9-168, 2009 XVI 4575977 at *5 (N.C. Cr.
App. Dec. 8, 2009) (finding that the victim was injured, "but a victim still requiring
medical attention when police arrive is not determinative of an ongoing emergency");
People v. Thomas, No. A104336, 2006 WI. 3775882 at *I (Cal. Dist. Cr. App.
2006) (noticing that the victiml was "'crying and very scared' . .. [with] a small
scratch . .. and . .. a 'bunch of lumps around her eye"' but the statements were tes-
timionial); Mason v. State, 225 S.W.3d 902, 911 (Tex.Ct. App. 2007) (finding the
statements testimonial even though the victim was "upset, crying and angry"); Suni-
ga, 2008 Wi. (finding statements testimonial "although the situation may still have
been very upsetting" to the victim).
80. See, e.g., People v. Johnson, No. C042274, 2006 WI. 3648929 (Cal.App. Dist. Dec.
14, 2006) (finding that the statement given to police the next day was non-
testimonial); ILewis v. United States, 938 A.2d 771 (D.C. 2007) (considering state-
ment given to police "several minutes" after their arrival as testimonial); Rodriguez v.
State, 274 S.W. 3d 760, 765 (Tex. Ct. App. 2008) (judging statements given to po-
lice non-testimonial when victim waited an hour to call the police); People v.
Saracoglo, 62 Cal.Rptr. 3d 418 (Cal.App. 2007) (deeming statements non-
testimonial when victim drove thirty minutes to police station to give statements).
81. See, eg, State v. Warsame, 735 N.W.2d 684, 692 (Minn. 2007) (finding that the
victim's "initial, volunteered statement" to the police was non-testimonial); Lewis,
938 A.2d at 781 ("We are satisfied that her initial, spontaneous statements were
clearly non-testimonial."1).
82. See, e.g., Lewis, 938 A.2d at 781 ("That some of her statements were made in re-
sponse to questions by the police does not transform the encounter into a testimonial
interrogation, even in the broadest, most 'colloquial' sense of the term."); People v.
ILewis, No. A 115107, 2007 WL 4206637 at *4 (Cal. Cr. App. Nov 29, 2007) (Find-
ing that the police officer asking "what happened" and the victim responding with
statements that "were effectively an accusation of criminal conduct" were non-
testimonial); Shea, 965 A.2d at 5 10 (finding the victim's non-testimonial statements
were a result of the officer asking "simple questions").
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monial, however, consistently noted the question/answer format as con-
13
tributing to the statement's formality and thus testimonial nature.
Finally, many courts believed the location of the defendant to be a key
consideration, but courts found the factor to cut both ways for the pur-
poses of classification. Several courts used the defendant's absence as a
factor for finding the end of the previous emergency and thus that state-
ments were testimonial;"4 other courts found the defendant's absence to be
an indicator that there was an ongoing emergency, because his location was
uncertain, and therefore that the statements were non-testimonial; 5 and
in some cases, courts found that the defendant's absence did not matter,
such that an unknown location could lead to either testimonial or non-
testimonial statements. 16Hence, cerinconsistencies existed when courts
83. See, e.g., Lewis, 938 A.2d at 782 (finding the officer's "detailed questions about how
the assault occurred and what had happened" prompted testimonial statements in re-
sponse from the victim); Mason, 225 S.W.3d at 911 (finding that the officer
"1questioned the complainant when she answered the door" producing testimonial
statements); Stare v. Mechling, 633 S.E.2d 311, 323 (W.Va. 2006) (explaining how
through their questions, the officers were "seeking to determine 'what happened"' in
the course of their interrogation; the statements were judged testimonial).
84. See, e.g., Meching, 633 S.E.2d at 323 (commenting "there was no emergency in pro-
gress . .. the defendant had clearly departed the scene when the interrogation
occurred" and accordingly finding the statements testimonial); Davis v. Srare, 268
S.W.3d 683, 705 (Tex. Cr. App 2008) (finding statements testimonial because the
defendant "had left the apartment" and thus there was no ongoing emergency); Ran-
kins v. Commonwealth, 237 S.W.3d 128, 129 (Ky. 2007) (finding that defendant
had "fled the scene" and thus there was no ongoing emergency); Thomas, 2006 WL
at *4 (finding statements were testimonial because there was "no emergency in pro-
gress . .. all of [the victim's] statements . .. were made after defendant had departed
the scene").
85. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 274 S.W.3d at 765-66 (finding that once the police confirmed
the location of the defendant, subsequent statements were judged testimonial, as the
emergency had ended); Cleveland v. Colon, No. 87824, 2007 WVL 179082 (Ohio Ct.
App. Jan. 25, 2007)(finding statements made by the victim "with the primary pur-
pose of enabling the police to 'meet an ongoing emergency,' i.e. to apprehend the
personnel involved"); Lewis, 2007 WIL at *3 (finding that the fact the officer "did not
know the identity or location of the assailant" contributed to the statements being
non-testimonial); People v. Otis, No. D046547, 2007 \XL 18814 at *13 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jan. 4, 2007) (explaining that police were attempting to gather information to
"find a potentially dangerous armed suspect"); State v. Shea, 965 A.2d 504, 505 (Vt
2008) (finding non-testimonial statements resulting from the fact that the police of-
ficer "did not know where the perpetrator was, whether he might return"); People v.
Suniga, No. F052710, 2008 WL 3090622 (Cal. Ct. App. July 3, 2008) (finding
statements to be non-testimonial in two separate instances when the police arrived
and the defendant and the victim were in separate locations).
86. See, e.g., Warsame, 735 N.W.2d at 694 (declaring that "extending an emergency
beyond the declarant's geographic proximity comports with the fundamental concern
the Supreme Court considered in Davis/Hammon" and concluding that the declar-
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classified Category Two statements in domestic violence cases-
stemming from disparate uses of factors such as victim mood and injury,
time elapsed, interrogation formality and defendant location-creating
little predictability in these stare court results.
Ninety percent of the Category Three statements-later statements
to police-were judged testimonial, making it as a Category less
consistent than 911 calls but significantly more consistent than initial
statements to police. As noted above, these statements fit the general
Hammon scenario of statements to police after a domestic dispute inci-
dent, but are distinguished from Category Two in that more time has
elapsed since the arrival of the police on the scene. This increase in time
means that police have had more time to complete an initial assessment
of the situation, to secure the scene, and to calm the victim and
therefore engage in questioning with a "primary purpose" of future pros-
ecution .8  The statements that do not exactly fit the Hammon scenario
are even more clearly testimonial because they occur in formalized
settings such as the police station and are tape-recorded."8 Accordingly,
the classification of the majority of these statements as testimonial be-
cause of lack of an ongoing emergency comports with the Davis v,
Washington framework.
The remaining categories consist of a much smaller sample of
statements, with the three categories represented by twenty statements
total. Statements made to medical personnel and statements made to
non-government/police officials, such as friends, family and neighbors,
were consistently non-testimonial: the courts found four of the five
medical statements non-testimonial and nine of the ten statements
made to non-police non-testimonial. In classifying these statements, the
courts are, if nor expanding Davis v. Washing-ton, then widely construing
the opinion, for the Supreme Court did not clarify the non-testimonial
nature of these types of statements until their 2008 Giles decision and
ant's unknown location at the time of the statements could produce testimonial or
non-testimonial statements).
87. See, e.g., People v. Walker, 728 N.W. 2d 902, 907 ("As in Hammon ... the police
questioning in this case first occurred in the neighbor's home, and there is no indica-
tion of a continuing danger . .. the victim's oral statements to the police recounted
how potentially criminal past events began and progressed."); State v. McKenzie, No.
87610, 2006 WXL 3095671, at *4 (Ohio Cr. App. Nov. 2, 2006) ("With [the defend-
ant] safely ensconced in the police car, the ongoing emergency ended. Any further
remarks by the victim were obviously intended for prosecution, not just apprehension
or cessation of the emergency."); People v. Garces, No. D045022, 2007 WI.
4384935, at * 19 (Cal. Cr. App. Dec 17, 2007)(Finding that the officer had solicited
statements from the victim's brother and mother before then talking with the victim,
while "aerling] in an investigative and/or prosecutorial capacity").
88. See, e.g., State v. Romero, 156 P.3d 694 (N.M. 2007).
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only five of the cases were decided after Giles.89 In Davis v. Washington,
the Court was presented with two cases involving police interrogations
and therefore discussed testimonial versus non-testimonial characteris-
tics only in the context of victim-police interactions. In a footnote in
that decision, Justice Scalia specifically stated that the Court's holding
concerns police interrogations but that "[rihis is not to imply . .. that
statements made in the absence of any interrogation are necessarily non-
testimonial. "90 In consistently classifying these non-interrogation state-
ments as non-testimonial, then, the state courts expanded Davis v.
Washington.
Category Six-miscellaneous written statements of the victim-is
less consistent, but the sample is also one of the smallest. Only five writ-
ten statements were part of the sample: two were non-testimonial, rhree
testimonial.9' W~(hile the small size of the sample makes it difficult to
draw any conclusions, statements that are written down are arguably
both more formal and created with more of an eye toward prosecution
than other verbal statements. Therefore, two statements classified as
non-testimonial is an arguable expansion of Davis v. Washington.
B. Admissible Versus Not Admissible
Of the eighty-two cases, fifty-nine found all of the statements at is-
sue admissible, ten found all of the statements inadmissible, eleven
found some of the statements admissible, and two cases were resolved
otherwise (evidence admissible only for impeachment, not for truth;
reversed on other grounds). Of the fifty-nine opinions that admitted all
of the statements, fifty-seven were affirmations of the lower court, and
two were reversals of the lower court.
All statements judged non-testimonial were admitted. Testimonial
statements, however, were often also admissible because courts found
that the defendant had forfeited his right of confrontation or because
89. Gile's v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2692-2693. (2008).
90. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 822, n.I1 (2006).
91. The written statements that were part of the sample included the following testimo-
nial statements: a note written by the victim stating that she believed her boyfriend
might poison her (State v. Sanchez, 177 P.3d 444, 453 (Mont. 2008)); transcript
from testimony at a preliminary hearing (People v. Beard, No. F052780, 2009 WL
179673 (Cal. Cr. App. Jan 27, 2009); People v. Byron, 170 Cal. App. 4th 657
(2009)); and the following non-testimonial statements: an affidavit executed by the
victim in support of the protective order taken out against her husband (Crawford v.
Commonwealth, No. 1194-07-2, 2009 WL 5083548 (Va. Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2009))
and a prior criminal history record (Grey v. State, No. 03 08 00355-CR, 2009 WL
3682598 (Tex. Ct. App. Nov 4, 2009)).
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the court found that the lower court's admission of the testimonial evi-
dence constituted harmless error. As a result, overall eighty-five percent
of the opinions found at least some of the statements in question ulti-
mately admissible. And of the opinions that found some or all of the
statements admissible, courts relied in whole or in the alternative on
harmless error or forfeiture thirty-nine times.
It is therefore clear that courts admit much unconfronted hearsay
evidence that has been classified as testimonial. This fact alone, but es-
pecially in conjunction with the testimonial versus non-testimonial
assessment above, arguably demonstrates the existence of a domestic
violence "exception" or expansion of Davis, as well as the lack of con-
sistency and predictability in these types of cases. If evidence is being
judged testimonial but is ultimately admitted as harmless error, then the
consistency of what the confrontation right entails decreases as the
amount of unconfronted hearsay admitted at trial increases. The scenar-
io is exacerbated if one considers that much of the evidence being
judged non-testimonial is objectively testimonial in the first place.
C Potential Explanations
Two explanations, which may account both for the large amount of
unconfronted hearsay admitted and for the inconsistency of testimonial
versus non-testimonial classifications post-Davis, are presented below.
The two explanations are likely both true in that they each individually
or conjunctively may explain an outcome in any particular case.
First, one explanation is that the Supreme Court in Davis in fact
construed the Confrontation Clause to allow the admission of much
unconfronred hearsay, and thus state courts are simply adhering to Su-
preme Court precedent. In Davis, the Court found that all statements
made during an ongoing emergency in the course of an interrogation for
the primary purpose of resolution of that emergency are admissible-a
Category which in many ways is broad, having the potential to include
many of the hearsay statements discussed above. For example, all of the
following statements are admissible under Davis: statements made by a
non-testifying victim to law enforcement while the barterer was in the
same house with her; statements made by a non-testifying victim to law
enforcement while the barterer's location was unknown and remained a
threat to the victim; and statements made by a non-testifying victim to
law enforcement in the course of trying to escape or hide from the bar-
terer. Accordingly, state courts are able to admit much unconfronted
hearsay as non-testimonial under the Davis framework, and thus state
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courts are in fact not expanding Davis but rather complying with the
expanse of Davis.
Under this first explanation, the inconsistency that exists may be
accounted for by the fact that while perhaps broad, Davis was also
vague. The Supreme Court provided more guidance than it had in
Crawford, but Davis still left much unclear. The Court explicitly did
not attempt[l ] to produce an exhaustive classification"' of testimonial
and non-testimonial statements.9 2 Among others, the Davis framework
leaves the following questions unanswered: whose purpose is controlling
(the Court implies that it is the police officer's or government agent's,
not the victim's, but is not clear)? How should the actors involved de-
termine the primary purpose of a statement (as pointed out in the
dissent, police are often "both respond~ing] to the emergency situation
and . .. gatherfingl evidence"9")? Lastly, how precisely should courts de-
fine both "ongoing" and "emergency?""4 The answers to these questions
and others are crucial to the testimonial classification. Lower court judg-
es are doing their best to comply with the Davis framework, but the
impreciseness of the Supreme Court opinion means inevitable disagree-
ments among reasonable judges on what constitutes testimonial
evidence.
An alternative explanation for the above results is that judges con-
sciously engage in a broad reading of Davis and in doing so create a de
facto confrontation clause exception in domestic violence cases. This
second explanation is a legal realist-based explanation wherein the re-
sults are understood as law made and interpreted by human beings and
social actors who are subject to imperfections and influences in their
interpretation of the law. Accordingly, the "act of judging [is] not imper-
sonal or mechanistic, but rather [is] necessarily infected by the judges'
personal values."9" As detailed above, the Crawfo rd/Davis framework has
been widely viewed as having a negative impact on domestic violence
cases because it often leaves prosecutors with little admissible evidence
and few options. judges are not blind to this situation. As noted by a
staff attorney in the Bronx Defenders office, "it is important to recog-
92. Davis, 547 U.S. at 822. In a similarly indeterminate statement the Court said, "we
reject the . .. implication that virtually any 'initial inquiries' at the crime scene will
not be testimonial [and] we do not hold the opposite-that no questions at the scene
will yield non-testimonial answers." Id. at 832.
93. Davis, 547 U.S. at 839 (Thomas, C., dissenting).
94. See Richard Friedman, Confrontation Clause Blog, http://confrontationright.
blogspot.com (last visited Sep. 20, 2010) (detailing close to twenty questions left un-
answered by the Court post-Davis).
95. WILLIAM M. WIECEK, LIBERTY UNDER L~w: THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERICAN
LIFE 187 (John Hopkins Univ. Press) (1988).
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nize that courts interpreting Crawford in a domestic violence context are
likely to be influenced by judges' institutional interests in preserving
evidence based prosecutions. "9 ' And further, state courts "will push the
limits to restore their own discretion to admit evidence when they see
fit.""7 judges lament the lack of government evidence and thus broadly
construe "non- testimonial" to allow unconfronted hearsay evidence nec-
essary to the prosecution. It is possible that in doing so, judges rely on
the old and familiar Roberts consideration of "reliability" to determine
admissibility."8
Under this second explanation, the inconsistency in the results
stems not just from reasonable judges disagreeing but also from judges
differently viewing, assessing, and interpreting the evidence based on
their values, imperfections, and social considerations. A judge may
choose to engage in a reliability evaluation of the statement(s) because
reliability was the ultimate consideration under the overruled (but well-
known) Roberts framework. A reliability evaluation may also enable a
judge to admit statements he deems necessary and relevant to the case at
hand. A judge may also consider reliability an ultimate consideration in
the admission of any hearsay statement and thus find it rational to apply
in a Confrontation Clause situation. The choice to engage in a reliability
evaluation, however, is neither universal nor uniform. Furthermore, if
judges are using reliability as their baseline concern, that consideration
would not necessarily map onto the testimonial versus non-testimonial
divide or onto the categories used to classify statements in this study,
creating additional unpredictability in the results. But again, the lack of
clarity and the uncertainty in Davis more easily enable judges to make
such conclusions.
IV. SHOULD THERE BE A DOMESTIC VIOLENCE "EXCEPTION"?
The last section explored the results of the state domestic violence
cases engaging Crawford/Davis to evaluate the predictability of testimo-
nial classifications and to determine whether courts routinely widely
construed or expanded Davis. This section will engage the normative
consideration of whether there should be a "domestic violence exception"
96. Jaros, supra note 41,at 1008.
97. Baxter, supra note 53 at 225.
98. Id. at 225 (predicting that "many stares will try to admit what they believe is reliable
evidence despite the fact that Crawfords holding obviated the Roberts reliability
standard").
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in confrontation doctrine." It will be argued that there should be such a
doctrinal exception in the confrontation framework so as to allow our
criminal justice system to more fully prosecute batterers and to help al-
leviate the classification unpredictability in such cases. This exception
would not entail revision of any Federal Rule of Evidence, as the right of
confrontation is a constitutional right. Instead, the exception would be a
common law, Supreme Court-created exception to the doctrine. 00
The Supreme Court affirmatively believes there should not be a
doctrinal domestic violence exception to confrontation. The Court in
Crawford emphasized that its history demonstrates that the Sixth
Amendment confrontation right is a procedural rather than substantive
right, such that it must be equally and consistently applied in all cases.
Thus, as Justice Scalia asserted, "dispensing with confrontation because
testimony is obviously reliable is akin to dispensing with jury trial be-
cause a defendant is obviously guilty."'0 ' It is not done. In Davis, the
Court affirmed the conception of the right as procedural. While the
Court did acknowledge that there are particular difficulties in domestic
violence prosecutions, by noting the susceptibility of victims to coercion
and the possibility of giving the defendant a "windfall," it refused to
treat such cases differently.10 2 justice Scalia stared, "[w]e may not..
vitiate constitutional guarantees when they have the effect of allowing
the guilty to go free."'0 3 He pointed out that the rule of forfeiture does
provide some protection to domestic violence victims because "one who
obtains the absence of a witness by wrongdoing forfeits the constitu-
tional right to confrontation. "''However, as discussed in Part I above,
two years later, in Giles, the Court made proving such forfeiture diffi-
cult, requiring proof of the specific intent of the defendant to prevent
the testimony.' 5 In Giles, the Court also expressly acknowledged the
99. In engaging in this normative consideration, this Article approaches the question
more from the perspective of those who support evidence-based prosecutions and no-
drop policies in domestic violence cases, rather than from the perspective of those
who support a confrontation right in its purest form. This is not to say that these rwo
perspectives are necessarily in direct opposition, but rather that "differing opinions
arise as to the reach of the Confrontation Clause to these specific situations." Id at
223.
100. As a contrast to the type of common law, doctrinal exception suggested in this Article
for domestic violence cases, see Tom Lininger's proposal to amend Federal Rule of
Evidence 804(b)(6), which codifies the doctrine of forfeiture by wrongdoing, in re-
sponse to the Giles decision. Lininger (2009), supra note 2.
101. Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36, 62 (2004).
102. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
103. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
104. Davis, 547 U.S. at 833.
105. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2680 (2008).
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prosecutorial difficulties presented by domestic violence but again spe-
cifically rejected the notion of an exception or different rule: "[diomestic
violence is an intolerable offense ... [but for that serious crime, as for
others, abridging the constitutional rights of criminal defendants is not
in the State's arsenal [of means to combat domestic violence] "'0 In its
recent confrontation cases, then, the Supreme Court has recognized the
inherent differences in domestic violence prosecutions but has refused to
make any exceptions to the defendant's (procedural) right of confronta-
tion.
Apart from the Supreme Court doctrine and its historical-
procedural rationale, there are additional reasons why there should not
be a domestic violence exception. First, perhaps there is no need for
such a doctrinal exception. As demonstrated by the results of state court
decisions, much hearsay evidence necessary to domestic violence prose-
cutions is being admitted. Much evidence is being judged non-
testimonial (sixty-three percent of all statements analyzed), and even if
some is judged testimonial, it is ultimately judged admissible through
harmless error or forfeiture (eighty-five percent of cases found at least
some of the statements ultimately admissible). Thus, if the purpose of
such a domestic violence exception is to ensure that prosecutors are able
to introduce hearsay statements crucial to their domestic violence prose-
cutions, the Davis framework as implemented by state court judges may
be said to be functioning sufficiently.
Second, the current framework enables judicial discretion in de-
termining the admissibility of statements, which is an aspect that is
important to our system's evidentiary structure and appropriate here.
The Federal Rules of Evidence confer enormous discretion to the trial
court judge as the ultimate decider on admissibility issues. The Federal
Rules include this type of discretion because admissibility decisions are
often incredibly contextual and dependent on a number of variables in
the trial and in the evidence; accordingly, the trial judge is often in the
best position to make the decision. 1 0 7 This rationale applies equally to
106. Giles, 128 S. Cr. at 2693. The Majority did, however, recognize that the domestic
violence context is "relevant for a separate reason," as a history of an abusive relation-
ship (the statements resulting from prior incidents of abuse) may be admissible to
prove the requisite intent needed in a forfeiture case post-Gils. Id. This discussion of
the use of a history of abuse, however, is simply an application of the general Giles
forfeiture rule.
107. See, e.g., Fed. R. Evid. 103 (mandating that reviewing courts disregard errors that do
not affect the substantial rights of the parties, thus conferring much discretion on the
trial judge); Fed. R. Evid. 105 (giving trial judges broad discretion to exclude even
unquestionably relevant evidence for reasons such as confusion of the jury or taking
up too much time). See also, e.g., United States v. Walton, 217 F.3d 443, 449 (7th
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Confrontation Clause decisions. In many instances, the right to con-
front is arguably more important than in others, and in these instances,
the judge can find the statements to be testimonial, while in others,
non-testimonial. For instance, in cases where the declarant has filed false
claims before or the context of the statement seems particularly unrelia-
ble, the judge can insist on confrontation (or no evidence) by deeming
the statement testimonial. Through this judicial discretion, then, both
the defendant's right to confront and the victim's justice in prosecution
are protected. In creating a doctrinal exception for all domestic violence
cases, some judicial discretion is necessarily removed.
Third, perhaps there is no need for such an exception because ac-
tors within the system can change and adapt to the Davis framework so
as to ensure admissible evidence in the futuire. As discussed above, it is
possible that judges have already adapted to the new framework by ad-
mitting evidence they have judged to be reliable by framing their
reliability considerations as Crawfo rd/Davis evaluations of primary pur-
pose, ongoing emergency, and testimonial or not. Prosecutors and
police, as other system actors, may also alter their behavior, if they have
not already begun doing so, to utilize the current framework to its fuill-
est. Prosecutors have the ability to structure their prosecutions around
the type of non-testimonial statements that the Court has made clearly
admissible. For example, Davis protected excited utterances made dur-
ing 911 calls and thus "maintained a large tool in the prosecutor's
repertoire. "'0 ' Further, in Giles, the Court clarified that "[s]tatements to
friends and neighbors about abuse and intimidation, and statements to
physicians in the course of receiving treatment" are non-testimonial.' 0
Thus, under the current framework, several types of victim statements
may be admitted and prosecutors should attempt to introduce those as
much as possible. Prosecutors should also decline to concede that a cer-
tain statement is testimonial, for as noted above, there is much room for
debate within the Davis structure; prosecutors may rake advantage of
that lack of clarity by arguing that seemingly testimonial statements may
actually be non-testimonial. Additionally, prosecutors could increase
their use of experts in domestic violence trials to ensure that the jury is
knowledgeable about the particularities of such a crime, to explain the
Cir. 2000), (stating that '[wie afford great deference to the trial court's determina-
tion of the admissibility of evidence because of the trial judge's first-hand exposure to
the witnesses and the evidence as a whole, and because of the judge's familiarity with
the case and ability to gauge the impact of the evidence in the context of the entire
proceeding.' (quoting United States v. Van Dreel, 155 F.3d 902, 905 (7th Cir.
1998))).
108. Baxter, supra note 53, at 223.
109. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2692-93.
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lack of victim presence and testimony, to clarify contradictions and mis-
conceptions that may exist about domestic violence, and to opine the
effects abuse can have on a person and a relationship."'0 Finally, prosecu-
tors may also engage in strategies to increase victim cooperation and
therefore provide in-court testimony, avoiding Crawfo rd/Davis problems
completely. Certain states have specialized prosecution programs,
increased victim advocacy, and specialized domestic violence courts, struc-
tures which they have found effective in reducing victim fear and
therefore increasing victim testimony.'" Increased prosecutorial commu-
nication and contact with the victim as well as minimization of the
burden on the victim are crucial in increasing the likelihood of victim
testimony.'1 While victims refuse to testify for a number of reasons, as
discussed above, these types of programs may help to overcome at least
some of the obstacles.
Of all the actors involved in establishing evidence in domestic vio-
lence cases, police have the most limited capacity to increase the amount
of admissible evidence. As stated in Davis, "Lw] hile prosecutors may
hope that inculpatory 'non-testimonial' evidence is gathered, this is
essentially beyond police control. Their saying that an emergency exists
cannot make it be so."'" That acknowledged, as prosecutors rely more
on other sources of evidence, the burden shifts to law enforcement to
find many of those sources. Police accordingly should ensure that they
"1gather as much evidence as possible and accurately identify all potential
witnesses and ways to contact them, or identify third parties who will
remain in touch with them."' Police may also function as an additional
communication tool with the victim, so as to increase the chances of
victim cooperation.
Even acknowledging the validity of the above outlined reasons to
keep the current conception of the confrontation right, it is clear that
the results under the current conception have been inconsistent and
110. Hussain, supra note 38, at 1317-19 (citing Jane H. Aiken & Jane C. Murphy, Evi-
d'ence Issues in Domestic Violence Civil Cases, 34 F~.iv. L.Q. 43, 46 (2000)) (outlining
how three types of expert opinion may be used to demonstrate an abuser's "silencing
influence: (1) the clinically based opinion, (2) the social framework opinion, and
(3) a hybrid of clinically based and social framework opinions").
III. ANDREW R. KLEIN, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE SPECIAL REPORT: PRACTICAL
IMPLICATIONS OF CURRENT DOMESTIC VIOLENCE RESEARCH: FOR LAW ENFORCE-
MENT, PROSECUTORS AND JUDGES, 40 (June 2009), available at http:ll
www.ncjrs.gov/pdffilesl/nij/225722.pdf. These types of special programs contained
aspects including: fast-track scheduling, reduction Of Victim vulnerability pending tri-
al increased victim contact pending trial and victim-friendly proceedings. Id.
112. Id. at4 1.
113. Davis v. Washington, 547 U.S. 813, 832 n.6 (2006).
114. KLEIN, supra note I111, at 42-43.
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unpredictable and therefore unsatisfactory. The results indicate that low-
er court judges have been forced to engage in somewhat of a dishonest
exercise, admitting what they find to be reliable evidence by labeling it
"1non-testimonial" and/or admitting such evidence through harmless
error. Thus while the current structure does provide for judicial discre-
tion, it is somewhat of a fictional and limited discretion. The arguable
"discretion" may actually be an impediment, for judges are forced to
couch their actual (reliability) assessments in testimonial versus non-
testimonial considerations: "Hino doubt many state courts view [Craw-
ford] as interference of their evidentiary sovereignty""' Additionally,
even if system actors have altered (or can alter) their behaviors, there are
significant costs in doing so. The types of evidence upon which prosecu-
tors are forced to rely, and that police are forced to collect, still often
leave insufficient evidence for prosecution and conviction. News reports
indicated that nearly fifty percent of domestic violence cases were being
dropped in some jurisdictions post-Crawford because of the lack of evi-
dence. "'Domestic violence continues to be perpetrated in the privacy of
the home, with few witnesses and little cooperation from the victim.
Thus even if prosecutors rely more heavily on experts and statements to
non-police, they still have very little upon which they may rest their
case. Finally, even if prosecutors are able to increase victim cooperation,
many argue that forcing a victim to testify constitutes a type of re-
victimization of the victim and accordingly something that should not
be forced."'
For the above listed reasons, it is evident that the Davis framework
has proved, if not unworkable, then at least heavily flawed within the
context of domestic violence cases. The creation of a doctrinal domestic
violence exception in the confrontation right of defendants would do
much to rectify the current major problems. 'While it does appear that
in many ways lower courts have engaged in a type of expansion of Davis
in domestic violence cases already, the creation of a clear, bright-line ex-
ception has several benefits. In general, bright-line rules enable courts to
function with more consistency: they send clear messages to the public
about the law and behavior in the particular area, enhancing the expres-
sive function of the law. Additionally they enable practitioners and
parties to more fully and reliably assess the strengths and weaknesses of
115. Baxter, supra note 53, at 225.
116. Raeder (2005), supra note 57, at 25.
117. See Lininger (2005), supra note 5, at 772 ("Testifying victims must relive the trauma
of domestic violence by describing it in court. They must endure the badgering of
both defense attorneys and prosecutors.").
[Vol. 17:175204
20111 CONFRONTATION AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE20
their cases.' 1 8 Applied in this context, a domestic violence exception
would rectify the inconsistency and unpredictability detailed above. In
creating such an exception, the law would be sending a clear and power-
ful message about the unacceptability both of domestic violence ansd of
intimidating victims in advance of trial-a message that the general
public embraces and yet one that is not reflected in confrontation doc-
trine. Moreover, the exception would help practitioners better evaluate
the strength of the case before them, for often the piece of evidence of
least certain admissibility is also the piece of evidence most important to
the case: the victim's statements.'9
As an initial conceptualization, such a doctrinal exception would
use the Davis framework of testimonial versus non-testimonial state-
ments but would broaden the concepts of "ongoing emergency" and
"1primary purpose" in domestic violence cases such that any statements
made by a victim in an abusive relationship, whether to law enforcement
or non-law enforcement, would be deemed non-testimonial. The prose-
cutor would be required to show to the judge's satisfaction that the
defendant imposed upon the victim a "classic abusive relationship,
which is meant to isolate the victim from outside help ... 1120 Upon
such a showing, the statements would be judged non-testimonial and
admissible if satisfying the other applicable evidentiary rules.
The theoretical rationale for such a reclassification of battering vic-
tims' statements is the cyclical and patterned nature of domestic
violence.'12 ' Domestic violence is a "pattern of harm in both a quantita-
tive and qualitative sense."'122 Both the frequency and duration of
domestic violence turn it into a pattern of harm quantitatively, consist-
ing of "repeated acts by the same offender against the same victim."
Studies have shown that over sixty percent of men who batter their
wives do so repeatedly; nearly twenty percent of women were victims of
abuse by the same partner ten or more times; and nearly seventy percent
118. Lininger (2009), supra note 2, at 893 (discussing the benefits of a new and bright-line
rule for forfeiture post-Cues).
119. See supra notes 53-57 (discussing the importance of victim statements to the prosecu-
tion in domestic violence cases).
120. Giles v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2695 (2008) (Auito, J., concurring).
121. See, e.g., EVE S. BuzAwA & CARL C. BuzAWA, OMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL
JUSTICE RESPONSE 89 (2d ed. 1996); LENORE E.A. WALKER, THE BATTrERED WOMAN
SYNDROME 85 (2d ed. 2000); Pdafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern
and Intent. An Alternative Reconceptutalization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. R~v. 552, 568-72
(2007); Mary Ann Dutton, Understanding Women's Responses to Domestic Violence A
Redefinition of Battered Woman Syndrome, 21 HOFSTRcA L. REV. 1191 (1993); Debo-
rah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm of Battering A Call to
Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CiuM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 959, 963-64 (2004).
122. Burke, supra note 12 1, at 567.
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of women who had been assaulted by an intimate partner reported that
their victimization lasted more than one year.' 3 The importance of both
power and control in domestic violence turns it into a pattern of harm
qualitatively, such that the ensuing harm comes nor only from the vio-
lence: physical battering is "just one method of inflicting .. trauma"
within a relationship characterized by numerous other forms. 2 2' Thus a
domestic violence victim exists in a relationship defined by long-term,
ongoing, powerful, and continuous abuse. It is accordingly clear that it
is illogical and impractical to attempt to find the beginning and end of
an "emergency" in such a context. Determining the contours of an
"temergency" can be arbitrary even in non-domestic violence contexts,
but it is even more arbitrary in the context of an abusive relationship,
where a victim is under constant threat of assaul~t or maltreatment. Cre-
ating a doctrinal exception in domestic violence cases means that judges
would no longer have to engage in such a capricious and ultimately un-
helpfuil exercise.
A domestic violence exception would deprive the defendant
charged with domestic violence of some of his tight of confrontation,
for he would nor always have the opportunity to confront all of his ac-
cusers, even if the statement was (under the current framework)
testimonial. Being deprived of any portion of a right in the criminal jus-
tice system is not a trivial concern. But this type of trade-off (less
confrontation for the defendant, more hearsay evidence for the prosecu-
tion) mirrors the trade-offs that exist throughout criminal justice system
and the Federal Rules of Evidence. The Federal Rules and the Constitu-
tion involve delicate balancing acts of disparate and often opposing
concerns. Here, while the defendant's right to confrontation is narrowed
in specific contexts (i.e. the abuse victim's unconftonted hearsay may be
deemed admissible), the defendant still maintains significant protections
provided to him by various parts of the criminal justice system and the
U.S. Constitution. The defendant still has the opportunity to cross-
examine the police officers or government officials who are witnesses in
court and thus subject their testimony to the "crucible of cross-
examination." The defendant still has the opportunity to present any
testimony, including his own, to rebut any hearsay statements of the
victim introduced under the exception. The defendant is still protected
by the hearsay rule, which is a separate limitation on out-of-court state-
ments, unaffected by any exception in the confrontation right. Further,
123. Id. at 567-68 (citing DONALD G. DTTrON, THE DOMESTIC ASSAULT OF WOMEN:
PSYCHOLOGICAL AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE PERSPECTIVES 112 (rev. & expanded ed.
1995) and Tjaden & Thoennes, supra note 1, at 39).
124. Id. at 568.
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the trial judge retains significant discretion under the Federal Rules to
exclude evidence deemed not relevant, unreliable, not probative or too
prejudicial, always providing a protection to the defense.2 2' Finally, the
U.S. Constitution further protects the defendant's rights through the
Fifth Amendment guarantees against self-incrimination and against
double jeopardy, and the Sixth Amendment guarantees to a speedy and
fair trial and to counsel.1
2
1
While creating such a domestic violence exception is undoubtedly a
significant change in confrontation doctrine, it is not entirely unimagi-
nable. The judicial conception of the confrontation right has been com-
completely reconfigured in the last six years and remains a live issue for
the Court.2  Moving from Crawford to Davis to Giles, the Court has en-
gaged in a continual refining and sharpening of the confrontation
right-a process which has grown out of the previous decisions and sub-
sequent effects of those decisions. Creating a doctrinal domestic violence
exception such as the one suggested above would simply constitute a
further refinement of the confrontation right, not any substantial break
in judicial precedent.
Additionally, the Court has proved that it is not blind to domestic
violence as a serious issue within the confrontation right. As mentioned
above, both the Davis and Giles majorities recognized the inherent diffi-
culties and obstacles particular to domestic violence prosecutions. For
example, in Davis, the majority stated that domestic violence is a crime
1notoriously susceptible to intimidation or coercion of the victim to en-
sure that she does not testify at trial."12' And in Giles, the Court noted
that "[a] cts of domestic violence often are intended to dissuade a victim
from resorting to outside help, and include conduct designed to prevent
testimony to police officers or cooperation in criminal prosecution."1
2
1
Further, while the majority in Giles does not create a separate rule for
domestic violence cases, it appears that a majority of the Court, based
on the various concurrences and dissents produced, may in fact support
a "softer" intent rule for proof of forfeiture in domestic violence cases. 30
125. See FED. R. EvID. 401-403.
126. U.S. CONST. amend. V; U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
127. In 2009 the Supreme Court decided Melendez-Diaz . Massachusetts, 129 S. Ct. 2527
(2009), a confrontation case involving the use of certifications of state laboratory
analyses instead of the analysts' live testimony. In January, 2010, the Court heard ar-
guments in Briscoe v. Virginia, 130 S. Ct. 1316 (2010), anothet confrontation case
involving a similar issue to that raised in Melendez-Diaz.
128. Davis v. Washington , 547 U.S. 813, 833 (2006).
129. Cules v. California, 128 S. Ct. 2678, 2693 (2008).
130. Fishman, supra note 7, at 731-32 ("[L]t is Justice Souter's approach, rather than jus-
tice Scalia'Is, that captured a majority of the Court on this issue [of proving intent].").
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This softer, "inferred intent" was discussed by justice Souter in his con-
currence and consists of a standard wherein intent may be inferred from
defendant's knowledge that his conduct would prevent the victim's tes-
timony. 13 ' While no such rule in forfeiture cases was imposed (and while
the composition of the Court has since changed), it is still an indication
of a willingness of at least some justices to potentially treat domestic vio-
lence cases differently in the context of confrontation issues. This
willingness suggests that a doctrinal exception to confrontation doctrine
for these cases is not out of reach.
CONCLUSION
"We concur ... that much of this law is archaic, paradoxical and
fu/I of compromises and compensations .... But somehow it has
proven a workable even i/ clumsy system .... To pull one mis-
shapen stone out of the grotesque structure is more likely simply to
upset its present balance between adverse interests than to establish
a rational edifice. 13
The above quote is from the 1948 Supreme Court decision Michel-
son v. United States, a decision concerning the use of character evidence
by the prosecution, but is a quote that in fact is appropriate here. The
quote reflects the idea that our system of criminal justice and the rules
that govern that system constantly engage in delicate balancing and in-
tricate trade-offs that only appear logical or justifiable when viewed as
an overall cohesive framework. To examine one portion of the arrange-
ment in isolation may create the appearance of unfairness or inequity.
Only when that one piece of the structure is examined in conjunction
with another piece does the system become workable and justifiable.
Thus in isolation, it may appear unfair to carve out a domestic violence
exception to the Confrontation Clause, for such an exception unques-
tionably infringes upon a defendant's constitutional right to confront his
accuser. But as detailed in this Article, once one considers the nature of
the crime of domestic violence, the particular challenges faced by prose-
cutors, and the protections that still exist unaffected for the defendant, it
appears that such an exception in fact fits into the "grotesque structure"
of our system. t
131. Giles, 128 S. Ct. at 2695.
132. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469, 486-87 (1948).
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) Totals
911 Immediate Later Medical Statements Written
Calls Statements Statements Statements to Non- Statements
to Police to Police Police
Non-Testimonial 31 29 2 4 9 2 77
Testimonial 0 23 18 1 1 3 46
No Ruling 3 1 9 1 1 0 1 0 1 14_
Total 34 61 21 5 11 5 137
Total Ruled Upon 31 52 20 5 10 5 123
Percentage 100% 56% vs. 44% 10% vs. 80% vs. 100% vs. 0% 40% vs. 63% vs.





Statements Admissible I 59
Statements Inadmissible 10
Some Statements Admissible, Some Inadmissible 11i
Other Dispositions 2
133. The cases listed in the Appendix are all domestic violence cases, defined and limited
as noted above in Section Four.
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